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Executive Summary 
1. Research question 
Digital identity entails critical technology, business and policy issues which, nowadays, affect 
practically every user, industry and government. Digital identities—the collection of digital 
information associated with an individual, organisation or entity—exist in a wide array of forms and 
formats, such as combinations of user-ids and passwords, PIN numbers, etc. Many people equate 
digital identity (eID) with government-issued identity cards sometimes containing a chip. However, 
digital identities are routinely created by users for a great many online transactions that are not 
government-related. Similarly, there are many applications such as e-health, e-government, identity 
brokering, digital rights management, electronic payments, and e-banking, where efficient identity 
management is essential. Market actors responsible for implementing and supporting these services 
are now experiencing barriers impeding growth in this area. 
There are many different barriers to the adoption of digital identity systems, for example: 
 social barriers such as the culture of distrust, the loss of anonymity, or possible role conflict.  
 potential economic barriers such as increased transaction costs or the high investment costs 
associated with the move to an increasingly digital economy.  
 technical barriers such as the existing proprietary standards and risks of lock-in, the lack of 
interoperability, and the legacy problems.  
 organisational barriers such as the lack of internal capacity of some corporations for 
addressing this complex problem, or the aversion to change.  
 legal barriers such as the multiplication of legal requirements, of corporate ID policies, and 
of national laws impacting identity.  
The purpose of this project was to identify the most important and/or most challenging technical, 
organisational and legal barriers to EU-wide deployment of digital identity technologies across both 
private and public sectors. After prioritising the barriers according to their importance and the ease 
with which they can be addressed, the study aimed to identify appropriate policy options in order to 
remove these barriers. The overall goals of the study have certainly been achieved. The study 
contributes significantly to a deeper understanding of the challenges, opportunities and threats in 
overcoming barriers to the EU market for eID. It also helps in raising awareness and promoting an 
advanced understanding of the eID research and policy climate. 
2. Overall conclusion  
A lot of ground was covered as a result of in-depth discussions during the project and at the 
prioritisation workshop.  Although the experts were not able to reach consensus on a list of the most 
important and/or challenging barriers with a view to prioritising them, a number of important 
insights emerge from this report.  As regards methodology, the study made clear that the technical, 
social, economic and legal aspects of problems facing digital identity are so inter-twined that it 
would be ill-advised to analyse these aspects separately.  In order to draw clear policy conclusions, it 
soon became obvious that policy making in this field is in need of a more compelling taxonomy or 
classification that would allow for a more thorough cross-disciplinary analysis.  Only after such a 
classification has been agreed on, can the various barriers listed in the report be tackled. 
The report analyses these barriers according to the scale on which the issue is considered most 
important and/or challenging (individual, systems, or project level).  This is interesting as a 
classification because the focus on the scale at which the problem is faced inherently points to the 
type of policy lever (technological, economic, or legal regulatory) that may be used to remove the 
particular barrier, as well as the level of decision making at which this may be done.   
The report acknowledges the fact that there is such a strong inter-relationship between the issues 
faced at the individual, systems or project level, that it is sometimes hard to draw firm conclusions 
for each of these levels.  Besides including a clear definition of the three levels, the report therefore 
2 
analyses most of the barriers from the ‘individual’ point of view, which is considered the dominant 
or default category.  Remaining problems are analysed from the systems or project angle only when 
it is clear that the individual dimension is not central to the issue at stake.  Second, though the 
classification does not specifically spell out the internal market dimension of the various barriers to 
deployment of digital identity systems, the report highlights the role of European Union policy 
making in overcoming barriers at various stages, and makes it clear when there is a genuine need to 
understand better the specifically European dimension of a particular barrier to digital identity. 
3. Study insights 
3.1 Foster inter-disciplinary research and discussion 
Nevertheless, a number of interesting insights can be garnered from the report. For a start, the 
discussions in the experts’ workshop made clear how sharp the divides are across the various 
disciplines. For instance, the inability to communicate effectively between the technical discipline 
and the policy discipline (private sector and government) is a particularly devastating obstacle. This 
could affect both the quality of public procurement and the prosperity of the eID sector. Semantic 
difficulties are viewed by many as one of the most critical barriers.  Despite the repeated production 
of glossaries in relation to identity projects, at present there is no commonality of discourse around 
eID.  
Taking this insight at the level of the study, the participants failed to agree on which barriers were 
the most important and/or most challenging, because experts across disciplines had different 
understandings of key policy determinants such as the "important" or "challenging" nature of a 
particular barrier, and of key concepts such as "trust." This strongly suggests there is a need to 
support more inter-disciplinary research and discussions in the field of digital identity.  
3.2 Strive for flexibility at all levels 
The uncertain nature and degree of a number of supposed barriers demands a cautious approach, in 
which maximum flexibility is guaranteed. This flexibility appears to be necessary at a number of 
levels. Neither industry nor users have shown any clear enthusiasm for a standard government-issued 
digital identity. From the user's point of view, it has also become clear that different demographics 
require different solutions. Good policy consequently supports maximum user choice and flexibility. 
There is great value to be gained from offering flexibility in the types of virtual digital identity 
adopted by users and the types of physical medium on which they can be stored. This permits 
individuals to choose the physical format which is most convenient or familiar to them, while still 
enabling organisations to issue a standard set of digital credentials which addresses security and 
privacy requirements.   
Likewise, a flexible approach to standards is vital to the effective interaction of identity systems 
across the region. Current standards regulation, based around older technologies like X.509, appears 
to be stifling the market for newer, more flexible solutions. The ideal would be to have a 
standardised technical core surrounded by varying optional elements, as implemented, for instance, 
in the US PIV programme.1    
There is also general recognition of the importance of interregional intransposability: i.e. the success 
of a system in one region does not automatically make it appropriate elsewhere. Local cultural issues 
are a vital consideration. The starting point is thus to limit the scale of the pilot projects before 
starting roll-out. Only such a flexible approach may eventually lead to successful EU-wide 
implementations. This view seems to be supported by the fact that smaller countries such as Austria 
and Belgium have been able to co-operate more effectively on digital ID than larger countries such 
as France and Germany.  
 
 
                                                        
1  See http://csrc.nist.gov/piv-program/ 
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3.3 Use widest array of policy tools  
The report offers a range of policy recommendations. This approach is useful with a view to 
tailoring the policy measure to the perceived seriousness of the problem at hand. The policy 
recommendations offered by the authors may be sub-divided into research recommendations, and 
soft, hard, and institutional solutions. Examples of soft law are guidelines, best practices; hard law 
takes the form of directives and regulations; institutional solutions are about the creation of a 
specific entity or authority in order to solve certain perceived problems.  
(i) Research recommendations 
Most of the research recommendations relate to users, and the problems they face when confronted 
with digital identity systems. The most pressing problem concerns data protection. The study reveals 
a need for closer investigation into the economic and social implications of data protection and 
profiling across the EU.  This would also provide the opportunity to investigate the degree to which 
the laws are, in fact, enforced and whether penalties provide an adequate deterrent. The remainder of 
the research recommendations concern the social aspects of identity systems, where investigation is 
considered to be more urgent and complex than many of the remaining technical problems. 
Examples include research into improving user experience, the human aspects of security, regarding 
the different mechanisms for building assurance and trust into identity systems, or seeking to 
identify the influence of demographics on individuals’ choices of identity tokens (i.e. preferences 
regarding storing credentials on cards, mobile phones, key fob tokens, etc.). 
(ii) Soft measures 
The report also points to a need to increase soft measures in the digital identity sector. A first type of 
soft measures consists in the mere coordination of existing industry efforts, or industry 
commitments. These could relate to (a) initiatives to encourage industry co-operation in making data 
protection a key focus, (b) support for initiatives which strive to develop a global data protection 
culture, such as the International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, or (c) 
incentivising industry efforts to develop effective technical mechanisms to control the use of 
information once it has been collected. Other examples relate to technical implementation and 
standardisation. A commitment by industry to put user experience at the heart of their identity 
systems, perhaps in association with standards bodies such as the ISO, may equally be useful. Given 
the potential for damage to reputation, prosperity and health from failures in identity systems, the 
highest standards in engineering for safety should be mandatory in their design. 
A second type of soft measure is the drafting of formal guidelines or an industry code of conduct on 
given eID-related issues. A framework could be developed, governing the interaction between 
hardware devices and soft identity credentials, to ensure that both flexibility and security are 
respected during the design process.  A layered model, similar to the OSI networking model, would 
appear to be the most practical way of approaching this. Similarly, industry could be asked to 
develop a formal scheme for certifying the strength of enrolment for different levels of functional 
credentials.  The existing ‘tScheme’ might serve as a model for this.2  This would provide a greater 
level of certainty when dealing with the wide variety of ID credentials across the region. Industry 
could also be asked to develop a standard code of conduct for electronic identity transactions, in 
order to clarify the responsibilities of the end user.  If implemented correctly, this could have a major 
impact on the amount of fraud due to phishing attacks. Finally, it might be helpful for industry to 
promote its own guidelines regarding revocation. At present, significant effort is expended on the 
design process, in order to give users access to a system. However, the reverse process of 
terminating access at the appropriate stage is often given a lower priority though it is necessary in 
order to secure the long-term integrity of identity systems. 
The most far-reaching soft measure is the centralisation of knowledge on particular issues. There is a 
wealth of experience available regarding the implementation of large-scale identity projects in both 
the public and commercial sectors in Europe.  Unfortunately, this experience is not particularly 
easily accessible, neither is it necessarily applied to subsequent projects. It would be good to make 
the knowledge widely available. One such instance might be the creation of a central log of large-
                                                        
2  See http://www.tscheme.org/ 
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scale government identity projects across the EU region, with open and unbiased reporting of the 
lessons, both positive and negative, to be learned from these projects. Where possible, details of 
relevant, international projects should be included. An example of this might be the implementation 
of Chip and PIN in the banking sector. The log should be openly accessible and give the option for 
regular moderated updates by interested parties, as well as comments and cross-referencing. Another 
example relates to standards, with the creation of an accessible framework of standards relating to 
identity, with annual updates, in order to assist with implementation projects.  The ECRYPT yearly 
report on algorithms and key sizes might serve as a model for this.3 
(iii) Hard measures 
The report identified two potential areas for hard law measures. The first such area is data protection 
law. The report points out that profiling is flourishing in both government and commercial contexts. 
This presents many ethical issues relating to privacy and the manipulation of personal data in order 
to influence individuals, even potentially in ways which they themselves may not fully comprehend. 
As a result of the EU legislation in the field, data protection already has a strong basis within the EU.  
There are, however, considerable differences in practice between the levels of protection offered in 
countries across the community. The report advocates the need for legal measures to ensure that 
‘personal information’ is understood in effectively the same sense in each jurisdiction. Additional 
measures may include (a) legal controls on the sale of personal information to third parties, (b) the 
promotion of privacy-enhancing technologies which offer unlinkability and would bring clear 
benefits, or (c) industry oversight by data protection authorities of the justification for their 
identification, authentication, authorisation and retention policies. 
The second area is standardisation. At present, each country makes its own standards, and there are 
even struggles for standards regionally within countries, resulting in a global explosion of standards. 
This is a very clear barrier to integration at the most basic technical level. EU-wide regulatory 
guidelines at the meta-level for building digital identity systems would be a positive step. These 
should be less prescriptive than current regulations. Member State governments could learn from the 
example of the US PIV implementation, by specifying a standard core for all of their identity 
requirements, but at the same time leaving scope for customisation around that core. 
 
(iv) Institutional solutions 
 
Finally, on a number of issues, there may be a need to reconsider the institutional configuration 
surrounding digital identity. This may include extending the responsibilities of existing authorities to 
include wider usability issues, the formation of an institution to raise standards in implementations 
relating to user experience across the EU, or support to existing initiatives to increase the 
understanding of identity across the EU, possibly through the creation of a non-profit organisation 
on the model of the US Interagency Advisory Board.4 
 
 
 
                                                        
3  See http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/ 
4  See http://www.smart.gov/iab/ 
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About the eID Barriers Study 
This report is the result of a study on barriers to digital identity, commissioned by the Institute of 
Prospective Technology Studies (IPTS).5 The objective of the study is to inform the policy process 
within the European Union on the socio-economic and technological developments taking place with 
respect to digital identity. Promoting an efficient identity management framework is a vital 
ingredient in achieving a European knowledge society, which is itself a target of the i2010 policy 
initiative and the Lisbon process. 
The study analyses technological, economic, social and legal barriers to the EU-wide deployment of 
digital identity technologies, as well as their broader implications. The main challenge of the study is 
thus to offer a detailed report on barriers to the EU-wide deployment of digital identification 
technologies, detailing the issues at stake for Europe. The study seeks to help achieve a deeper 
understanding of the challenges, opportunities and threats in overcoming identified barriers to the 
EU market for eID from the point of view of the European policy-maker. Furthermore, it aims at 
raising awareness, with a view to promoting an advanced understanding of the eID research and 
policy climate. 
The scope and detailed specification of research has been prepared by IPTS. The study has been 
performed by Consult Hyperion in cooperation with IPTS, between October 2006 and June 2007. 
Many persons have contributed to make this report possible. The report was written by Dave Birch, 
Margaret Ford, John Elliott from Consult Hyperion. It was validated at a workshop by an 
interdisciplinary and international group of experts on 28th February-1st March 2007. The results of 
the validation workshop have been used to enrich and complement the report. Throughout the work 
process towards the final result, it was thoroughly reviewed and edited by Ioannis Maghiros and 
Boris Rotenberg from IPTS. We are most grateful to everyone who contributed to this study (see 
acknowledgments). 
 
Structure of the report 
The report that follows is composed of four parts. The first part considers the digital identity barriers 
that are most relevant from the individual users' point of view. The second part analyses the issues at 
the system-level. The third part discusses the digital identity barriers from a more macro perspective, 
namely from the project level. The final part analyses the situation and presents recommendations 
for further initiatives in Europe, focusing on each of the three levels identified and discussed in the 
previous parts. The contents of the first four parts are presented in more detail below.  
Section 1: Individual-level barriers 
This section is dedicated to the investigation of issues relating to the integration of digital identity 
which have the greatest effect at an individual or personal level.  As one might expect from 
discussions surrounding identity, all related issues could be considered as relating to the 
‘individual’.  However, where there are also significant systems or project elements, the relevant 
issues have been assigned to those sections. The content of this section is as follows: 
• User-centricity 
• Data sharing and data protection 
• Profiling 
 
 
                                                        
5  IPTS is one of the 7 research institutes of the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre. 
 Section 2: Systems-level barriers  
This section is dedicated to the investigation of issues relating to the integration of digital identity 
which have the greatest effect at a systems level.  The study finds that a number of problems 
become more apparent at this level, and consequently analysing it from this angle may help 
devising appropriate solutions. The content of this section is as follows: 
• Lack of semantic understanding 
• Physical/logical separation – demographics 
• Identification, authentication and authorisation 
• Appropriate use of standards 
Section 3: Project-level barriers  
This section is dedicated to the investigation of issues relating to the integration of digital identity 
which have the greatest effect at a project level.  The study finds that a number of barriers transpire 
from a closer look at this level, and consequently that this is the level from which these need to be 
addressed. The content of this section is as follows: 
• Learning from mistakes – start with small scale pilots 
• Interregional intransposability 
Section 4: Conclusions and policy recommendations 
This section proposes a series of policy recommendations and options. It follows the structure of 
the report in that the recommendations are sub-divided in three levels: individual, systems, and 
project level. 
Annexes  
The report includes the following in annex:  
• Appendix A: List of references. 
• Appendix B: List of acronyms (Glossary). 
• Appendix C: Results of the validation workshop survey. 
 
